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Abstract: Paper considers the foundations, results and perspectives of transition process in 
Serbia. The foundations were the postulats of neoclassical economics, the mainstream in 
recent economic thought. They determined the goal, the methodology, and the ideological 
basis of this process, and resulted especially in Washington Consensus. The results of the 
reforms, based on Consensus, showed, with some exceptions, that Serbia, as the other former 
socialist countries, realized deep and long-term economic fall, followed by similar processes 
in other spheres. Contrary to ordinary opinions that transition crisis show as result of 
inconsistency in reforms taking, the paper argues that this is normaly its result. As an 
analogue is the Morgenthau’s plan for West Germany observed, that has promoted Germany 
to industrial disarmament, and that would lead to its poverty and its transformation into raw 
material basis for the developed economies, and to impossibility of survival of the existing 
number of population. Fortunately for the Germany, Morgenthau’s plan was abandoned and 
Marshall’s plan was introduced. It lead to industrial renewal of Germany. For the transition 
countries it is also necessary, considering the practice and basic principles of the Other 
Canon, which have they origins as far as from the economic policy of Henry VII, to acess re-
industrialization in the same way, which is the necessity for renewall of economies, and for 
overcoming the long-term crisis. 
 
Key words: Washington Consensus, Other canon, Morgenthau’s Plan, Marshall’s plan 
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TRANSITION IN SERBIA: FOUNDATIONS, RESULTS AND 
PERSPECTIVES 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 More than twenty years of the implementing reforms in transition process in eastern 
Europe made too many evidences for a comprehensive estimation of this process. The 
foundations and the results of transition can be objective observed and the perspectives for 
these countries concluded. After the catastrophic decade of 1990’s, the beginning of XXI 
century brought the encouraging tendencies in the most of these countries ‒ the results 
(production and living standard) from the years of pre-transition were reached in the middle 
of first decade (figure 1). But the recent financial and economic crisis shows how much these 
countries are far from promised prosperity and welfare. 
 The long-term crisis of transitional economies (and societies) requires the serious 
examination the foundations of transition process and the search ways for their development. 
The purpose of this paper is to consider both of these aims, with special attempt to present the 
results of transition process in Serbia. 
 The new development strategy for Serbia must consider the ideas of alternative 
economic theory, that is derived from the other canon which have its origins as far from the 
economic policy of Henry VII. So, these countries can acess re-industrialization, which is the 
necessity for renewal of economies, and for overcoming the long-term crisis. 
 
2. FOUNDATIONS OF TRANSITION PROCES 
 
 The Fall of the Berlin Wall 1989 and the end of cold war are certainly the most 
significient events at the end of the XX century. They lead the countries of Eastern and 
South-Eastern Europe to a fundamental problem: how to make a transition from planned 
towards market-based economy, but they also created an ambient, in which it would be 
possible to discuss, without prejudice and ideological burden, among the others the role of the 
State in economic development. Unfortunately, the mainstream economics’ thought – as a 
result of the standard assumptions of neoclassical theory – hampered this consideration of 
two fundamentally different economic outlooks: a production-centered and activistic-
idealistic (Renaissance) tradition and a barter-centered and passivistic-materialistic tradition 
of Smith, Ricardo and neo-classical economics (Reinert 1999: 270). 
 Without pre-made recipes for development of market institutions and market 
economy, or, as it was the case with Yugoslav experience since the 1950s, simply supressed, 
creators of the changes in this countries accepted foreign experts and recipes issued by 
international financial institutions with IMF in front. In their basis were neo-classical 
postulates, ideas of “natural harmony” created by the market mechanism, that recent make 
the core mainstream in economic thought. “Natural harmony”, or a world void of any 
systemic effects, world of Samuelson's factor price equalisation (Samuelson 1948), will make 
all wage earners of the whole world equally rich – if we can only “get the prices right” and 
“provide a level playing field”. The dominance of neoclassical economics was the decisive 
factor in determining the transition strategy. Consequently, there was no debate on goal, 
method and ideology underpinning the transition process. 
 Recommended prescriptions were geografically and historically specific and were 
meant to solve problems of Latin America. However, former socialist countries have they 
accept, as well as the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Quickly, they were became “the 
general wisdom for growth and development policy“ (Marangos 2009: 197). These recipes 
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are known as Washington Consensus, the term coined by J. Wiliamson in 1989 (Wiliamson 
1990), with next policies (table 1). Reformers in these countries, and their advisors, 
emphasized that transition would bring temporary crisis, and then, very soon, the economies 
would renewal, and their new ownership structure will ensure a quick compensation for the 
temporary decrease and then a quick growth and catching up with developed countries. 
 
Table 1. Original and augmented Washington Consensus 
 
Original Washington Consensus "Augmented" Washington Consensus, the 
previous 10 items, plus: 
1. Fiscal discipline 11. Corporate governance 
2. Reorientation of public expenditures 12. Anti-corruption 
3. Tax reform 13. Flexible labor markets 
4. Financial liberalization 14. WTO agreements 
5. Unified and competitive exchange rates 15. Financial codes and standards 
6. Trade liberalization 16. “Prudent”capital-account opening 
7. Openness to FDI 17. Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes 
8. Privatization 18. Independent central banks/inflation targeting 
9. Deregulation 19. Social safety nets 
10. Secure Property Rights 20. Targeted poverty reduction 
 
Source: (Williamson 1990); (Rodrik 2003; 2006) 
 
 The goal of reforms had to be competitive capitalism, the methodology neoclassical 
economics, and the ideological foundation self-interest. The individual conditions of each 
country was not in concern. The debate on transition was restricted to the speed of reform. 
The only concern was whether transition economies should immediately liberalise, stabilise, 
and privatise, that required so-called shock-therapy approach, or implement the neoclassical 
policies gradualistic, at a slow pace (gradualist approach). 
 But, as was shown in (Marangos 2002), debate between the supporters of two 
approaches, in fact was immaterial. Both approaches adopted a combination of shock-therapy 
and gradualist strategies. In Serbia, this was also the case, although the transition process had 
many special characteristics, as a result of the known events in the 1990’s. 
 What mean principles of Washington Consensus? Let we see. 
1) Means that public revenues should cover public expenditures, because budget deficit 
lead to inflation and to balance of payments deficit. 
2) This suggested switching expenditure, in a progrowth and propoor way, from things 
like nonmerit subsidies to basic health care, education, and infrastructure. 
3) The aim is a tax system that would combine a broad tax base with moderate marginal 
tax rates. This would increase fiscal, and then total public revenues. 
4) If exist control of interest rates, it must be cancelled. 
5) Central Bank has to ensure that appreciated domestic currency does not jeopardize the 
competitiveness of domestic economy in external trade. 
6) As a general approach, without pointing out the swiftness of its application. 
7) It does not refer to comprehensive capital account, but only to FDI, in the meaning 
that all foreigners should be able to invest, build or buy something, and should be able 
to do that without limitations. 
8) It is assumed that privatization, if conducted properly, is beneficial, whether 
privatized enterprises do business in competitive market, whether they are regulated. 
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9) It refers, primarily, to removal of barriers to entry given market, which increases 
competition, as well as the exit barriers for firms, not а removal regulation of safety of 
production, ecology regulation, or economic regulation in case of natural monopolies. 
10) It is necessary to ensure to gain property rights at an acceptable cost. 
 Is this set of policies acceptable? Williamson emphasized uniqueness of 1989 
(Williamson 2003: 11), and critics of Consensus emphasized that some of the important 
policies are missing, for example social equality and institutional development. This is 
unquestionable, and Williamson later supplemented the program, and named it After the 
Washington Consensus (Williamson 2006). However, it’s important to estimate original 
policies, because they were practically implemented. It’s clear that in these evaluations 
couldn’t be (and shouldn’t be) a consensus, but still, surprisingly, there are many our 
economists that fully support these policies. In my opinion, uncritical relation toward policies 
of the Consensus can’t be good – they must be considered individually in the context of 
specific economy and concrete period of time. 
 The ideas from the Consensus had a huge influence on the economic reforms of many 
countries, among them on postcommunist, although the way these countries interpreted these 
ideas varied significantly. However, the orginal policies reigned unchallenged for only a short 
time. International economic and political circumstances has been changed, as well as 
domestic condition in reforming countries. So appeared new problems and the original 
proponents of the Consensus had to search for new answers. These answers often 
complemented the original recommendations of the Consensus, but not always. Also, new 
goals, more complex and difficult, were constantly added to the list of requirements, so the 
final frontier of the reform process became mere preconditions for success. 
 
3. RESULTS OF THE TRANSITION PROCESS IN SERBIA 
 
 Through the reforms, the institutional ambient has been radically changed: for most 
prices a free price system was introduced, foreign exchange was liberalized, subsidies were 
cut, currencies were devaluated and made convertable, restrictive credit policy was 
introduced, borders were open for foreign capital, most of the state-owned enterprises were 
privatized. In most cases, it is all done by “shock therapy” (all, right now, at the same time). 
The applied model assumed that the market institutions would spontaneously lead to 
capitalism, as soon as the ownership was privatized, prices were free, currency was stabilized 
and free competitive market was established. The economy should, after a short period of 
crisis, spontaneously lead to the renewal of production and economic growth. 
 
Figure 1. GDP of Serbia 
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Source: (NSPO 2013) 
 
 These changes, however, weren’t backed with proper and suitable changes in real 
sector. The results achieved are well known, and there is no point in repeating them here. 
They undoubtedly show failure. 
 The implementation of reforms prescribed in Consensus and after gave not expected 
results: instead of the promised prosperity, the majority of countries measured a great and a 
long-term fall in GDP, industrial production and living standard. Serbia was not an exception 
– its GDP fell almost 30% of its value in 1989. Figure 1 shows data series of GDP (for period 
1989–2012), without, as the other data in this paper, the data for the Autonomous Province 
Kosovo i Metohija, and GDP for 28 transition countries1. 
 Greatest losses were in industry. The industrial output in 2012 is on the level of 39% 
related to 1989 (figure 2), many branches drastically decreased output, and some seized to 
exist.2 As the industry is moving force of technological progress, an engine to economic 
growth and creator of synergetic effects in all economy (Serra 1613), this presentation of its 
decrease is by itself enough to mark the whole period as “negative”. 
 
Figure 2. Industrial output in Serbia (1989=100) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on (РЗС 2010; 2012) 
                                                          
1 Albania, Azerbaijan, Belorus, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Estonia, Georgia, Croatia, 
Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Latvia, Litva, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldavia, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. 
2 It is great drop 1999, a year of NATO bombing. That factor and others during the 1990s (economic sanctions, 
wars in the surrounding republics) are not to be underestimated. However, a drastic drop of industrial output is 
clear. 
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 In most transition countries, the economic crisis was followed by other negative 
consequences, such as a great demographic crisis – decline in population, spread of the 
diseases, a drop in fertility, increase in mortality. The depth of demographic crisis is probably 
best illustrated by the Russian Cross, detected in 1992 in Russia: curves of dynamics of live 
births and deaths were crossed. This happened in Serbia in same year (figure 3), with 
constantly increased gap. 
 Transition resulted in great social expenses – increased poverty, unemployment and 
inequality, aggravation of public services and their polarization, criminal, increase in 
corruption and citizen unrest. Finally, we should point out vast external obligations, which 
happened in spite of great privatization revenues and great inflow of foreign remittance. 
Estimations of all inflows (privatization, foreign direct investments, foreign remittances) are 
different, from 30 even to 70 billions euro, only for the period since 2000. This huge inflow 
wasn’t directed in production, or to rebuild tragically underdeveloped infrastructure, but in 
consumption from import. 
 
Figure 3. Natural population changes in Serbia 1990–2011 
 
 
 
Source: (РЗС 2011) 
 
 For this enormous consumption growth from import almost always is blamed the 
relative appreciation of RSD, but not foreign exchange liberalization which was swiftly and 
uncritically conducted at the beginning of the decade 2000s, according to requirements of 
Consensus. According this argumentation, appreciated exchange rate destimulates export and 
stimulates import. Both sides of argumentation, however, are questionable: source of inlow 
from which the foreign currency is bought and the imported goods are payed should be taken 
into consideration when we talk about import, and more detailed explanations are necessary 
when we talk about export. 
 
Figure 4. External debt of Serbia 2001–2012 (%)3 
                                                          
3 In september 2010 the methodology of external debt was changed, so the data for 2010 and later for indicator 
„External debt/export of goods and services” are not comparable with previous years. 
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Source: (НБС 2010; 2012) 
 
 It is wrongly assumed that RSD devaluation would increase competitiveness of our 
export, even if there is production that could be exported. Devaluation of RSD doesn’t 
change prices of our goods in foreign markets, so they wont be easier to export.4 It will only 
lead to redistribution between domestic manufacturers: more wealth will go to exporters (in 
RSD, nominally). Moving of export and import is not affected by nominal exchange rate, but 
its long term trend, expressed as real exchange rate (Tasić i Zdravković 2008). It is well 
known that prices in our markets, for a long time, almost automatically adjust to EUR 
(previously with DM), and react very quickly to changes in exchange rates. So the effects of 
changes in exchange rate of RSD quickly disappears, and previous constellation is 
established, on higher nominal value. So what changes? 
 
Figure 5. Structure of external debt of Serbia 2000–2012 (мill. €) 
 
 
 
Source: (НБС 2010; 2012) 
 
 Next important moment is high external indebtedness. This indicator is also unequall 
between countries, and it is comforting to say that extreme indebtedness is phenomenon that 
exists in some other countries as well (Greece). As we can see (figure 4), except in 2001, 
Serbia is, according to External debt/GDP indicator, in a group of medium indebted, although 
moving towards highly indebted countries. Second indicator (External debt/Export), 
                                                          
4 Export is possible with lower export prices (damping), and exporters would be compensated with greater 
amounts of RSD. But that is not allowed, and aside from that, it would meant a spillover of value created in 
country. 
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excluding 2006–2008, shows significant and belongs to highly indebted countries. (WB 
criteria frontiers for high indebtedness are 80 and 220). 
 The share of public and private sector in total debt is important. It is often emphasized 
as a (relatively) favorable circumstance. According to the official data (figure 5), it really 
seemed so. However, who can guarantee that the state (tax payers) won’t pay back debts that 
isn’t hers and wasn’t guaranteed by the state? But from 2008 situation clearly is different, so 
this argument is not relevant. 
 
Figure 6. Privatization revenues 2002–2012 (mil €) 
 
 
 
Source: [МФ 2012] 
 
 There was high indebtness inspite of high revenue obtained through privatization as 
well as significant remittances from emigrants. Estimations as far as all those sources 
(privatization, FDI, remittances) differ, from some 30 USD billions to even 70, only in the 
period from 2000. See how these estimates can be proof by official data. 
 
Figure 7. Foreign direct investments 2001‒2011 (mill. eur) 
 
 
 
Source: National Bank of Serbia, in [Kovačević 2012] 
 
 According to Privatization Agency, between 2000 and 2012 the Government realized 
revenue of 3,65 billions euro (2,576 i.e. 1,076 respectively) by selling state enterprises and 
investments (see figure 6). 
 The focus on foreign direct investments, as potential initiators of redevelopment of the 
economy, was very present just after 2000. As the figure 7 shows, thanks to FDI, in the 
period of 11 years, the revenue was 14.929 billions euro in total, most of which was by far 
received in 2006. However, the sector structure of these investments was not favorable: the 
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largest amount was invested in financial intermediation and commerce, which were followed 
by manufacturing industry. 66% of all FDI were invested in the service sector. 
 
Figure 8. Remittances in Serbia 2003‒2009 
 
 
 
Source: (World Bank 2011) 
 
 Besides the cited sources, remittances are another important source after 2000. 
Without getting into the methodological problems of collecting data about the remittances, 
we will just cite the World Bank data (World Bank 2011). According to these data, the inflow 
of foreign remittances to Serbia is shown in Figure 8. As we see, it has been about 5.5 billion 
US$ per year in the last few years, or 34 billion US$ in period 2003‒2009. 
 This huge inflow, however, wasn’t used productively, not even for the sake of the 
(tragically) underdeveloped infrastructure. Instead, it transformed into consumption (of 
imported foods, of course, having in mind the poor state of the domestic production). 
Considering the reasons of this fact goes beyond our paper. 
 
4. PERSPECTIVES FOR RENEWAL AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Intensity of negative changes and, especially, longevity of negative results of the 
transition process initiate the review of the term transition crisis, or transformational 
recession, or should determinate its new meaning. However, initiators and protagonists of 
reforms in these countries don`t want do, or are not able to see at first the reforms results. Or 
apply some of the well known evading techniques in facing them.5 Basic principles and 
strategies are not questioned, and the lack of results is explained by inconsistency in handling 
the reform, and by limitations set by politics, so that it is all brought down to a mere technical 
problem of reform undertaking. In that case, all debates about causes of crisis and possible 
means to prevent it, are stopped. Why does this happen? 
 
Table 2. Basic characteristic of Marshall’s and Morgenthau’s plans 
 
Marshall’s plans Morgenthau’s plans 
Creates “improved” Exclusively creates “improved” 
Schumpeterian activities: Malthusian activities: 
(= ‘good’ export activities) (= ‘bad’ export activities if no 
Schumpeterian sector present) 
Specialising brings increasing returns / After a certain point, specialisation will cause 
                                                          
5 See more detailed consideration in (Буквић 2011). 
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economies of scale unit production costs to rise causes 
diminishing returns 
Dynamic imperfect competition „Perfect competition“ 
High growth activities Low growth activities 
Price stability Extreme price fluctuations 
Generally skilled labour Generally unskilled labour 
Creates a middle class Creates ‘feudalist’ class structure 
Irreversible wages (‘Stickiness’ of wages) Reversible wages 
Technical change leads to higher wages to the 
producer (‘Fordist wage regime’) 
Technical change tends to lower price to 
consumer 
Creates large synergies (linkages, clusters) Creates few synergies 
 
Source: (Reinert 2006: 100) 
 
 But this debate is realy necessary. And for it to be succesfull, it must adress the core 
of the problem. The reconsideration of Consensus must be in focus, as well as its theoretical 
basis on which it was built and is sustained. Regardlessly that many countries were drawn to 
poverty, as a consequence of its recipes. So we must not think that the generall approach is 
good, and that only some of the policies and measures are bad, and not conducted properly. 
 Although Consensus was meant to solve “local problems”, their policies were soon 
accepted as a general approach for all developing countries. It is considered that it’s policies 
are enough to initiate economic growth and remove stagnation. Great role of the free market 
within set of policies is the reason it`s often called neoliberal (even “neoliberal manifesto“), 
although Williamson emphasized that it’s not right, that term neoliberalism was coined to 
describe doctrines espoused by the Mont Pelerin Society, and that there are a number of 
distinctively neoliberal doctrines that are conspicuous by their absence policies of Consensus 
(Wiliamson 2003: 11).6 
 
Table 3. Means for national economic development 
 
1. Acceptance that wealth is created in relations between activities with increasing returns 
and continuous mechanization. Understanding that the state is in wrong “field of 
specialization“. Aware of policies it supports, stands for and protects these activities. 
2. Temporal monopoly should be given to these activities in certain geographic area / 
patents / and customs protections. 
3. Acceptance that economic development is synergetic fenomenon, so that diversity and 
division of labor in economy are imposed. “Maximizing labor division and number of 
jobs in country“ (A. Serra) and copying economic structure of Venice and Holland. 
4. Theoretical understanding that industrialization (and advanced service activities) 
simultaneously solve four great economic problems of poor countries: increase value 
added, increase employment, increase wages and decrease balance of payment deficit. 
5. Significance of attracting competent labor from abroad (which is more important than 
foreign capital). This was already very important in England, in the period of Tudor 
dynasty (throughout the history, many nations deprived themselves of most educated 
citizens through religious persecution). 
6. Relative oppression of large landowners. From Florence in XIII century through 
England since 1485, to South Korea after WWII. Physiocracy (the foundation of 
                                                          
6 The origin of Neoliberalism can be found in the time of 1930s, in pre-war Germany, when the German 
Freiberg School was active (Boas & Gans-Morse 2009: 145). 
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standard economics) was a revolt of large landowners against that kind of policy. 
7. Tax incentives for economic activities we wish to develop. 
8. Inexpensive loans for same activities. 
9. Export support for same activities. 
10. Helping to increase arable land and incentives to agriculture in general, although we 
must bear in mind that agriculture itself cannot drive the country out of poverty. 
11. Focus on education and knowledge. 
12. Patents protection for new inventions. 
13. Export duties and export prohibitions so that raw materials would become more 
expensive for foreign industry (used in England in XVI century, with great efficiency, in 
order to break Italian textile industry). 
 
Source: (Reinert 2006: 44–46) 
 
 Of course, we must bear in mind that “reforms were uneven and remained 
incomplete“, as in Report emphasized IMF7, which is true, although the conclusion drawn 
(“According to its authors, the problem was not with the approach taken to reform, but that it 
did not go deep and far enough.“) is questionable. From this point of view, the failures have 
to be chalked up to too little reform of the kind that Consensus has advocated all along and 
not to the nature of these reforms itself. Also, the policy implication that follows is simple: do 
more of the same, and do it well. However, what has become clearer to practitioners of the 
Consensus over time is that the standard policy reforms did not produce lasting effects if the 
background institutional conditions were poor: sound policies needed to be embedded in solid 
institutions. The upshot is that the original Consensus has been augmented by a long list of 
so-called “second-generation“ reforms that are heavily institutional in nature (table 1) 
(Rodrik 2003: 42; 2006: 978). 
 As the starting point, we can use the experience of the renewal of Germany after the 
WWII. Feared that Germany could once again cause war, the allies accepted in 1944 a plan 
that ought to disindustrialize and make it an agrar country. Industrial machines should be 
removed, mines closed and filled with water and cement. The Germany should be turned into 
a land of small farmers. Then it would a peacefull nation, and the closer contact to the land 
and agriculture would bring moral restoration and pacification of its people. The author of 
plan was H. Morgenthau.8 Plan became active as Germany was defeated.9 It has become 
obvious in 1946 and 1947 that the plan created great problems. Former US president H. 
Hoover lead the team of experts to visit Germany and to report about the nature and the 
causes of problems. In the last report he emphasized main illusion about the development of 
Germany: “There is the illusion that the new Germany (...) can be reduced to a ͵Pastoral 
Stateʹ. It cannot be done unless we exterminate or move 25,000,000 people out of it“ (Hoover 
1947: 28). Hoover’s reports rediscovered the core of old mercantilistic theory of population: 
“Industrial nation can maintain and nourish many people than it can agriculture state at the 
same place.“10 Just as A. Smith emphasized: “the difference is very great between the number 
of shepherds and that of hunters whom the same extent of equally fertile territory can 
                                                          
7 According to (Rodrik 2006: 977). 
8 Term Morgenthau's Plan usualy is used either to designate the described agreement or to mean any postwar 
program designed to effect and preserve German disarmament by significantly reducing its industrial might 
(Gareau 1961: 517). Second meaning can be enlarged to any plan that leaves out industrialization as a factor to a 
country development. 
9 See original in (Irving 1986) or more detailed description of Morgenthau's Plan in (Chase 1954). 
10 According to (Reinert 2006: 100). 
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maintain“ (Smit 1970: 869), with implications on defense power of the country. This means 
that industrialization increases country sustainability. 
 Morgenthau plan was quietly stopped. Instead Marshall’s plan was introduced, which 
goal was reindustrialization of Germany (and other Europe). The plan was inaugurated in 
june 194711 with the explanation which has already been known since the beginning of XVII 
century thanks to the A. Serra, that production of raw materials and industrial production are 
subject to different laws (Serra 1952: ch. 3). These arguments were used after the WWII in 
favor that raw-material production based countries also needed industrial sector. Recent 
mainstream in economic science, unfortunately, based on neoliberal dogma, forgot this 
opinions, and through its enforcers, with IMF on the head, even directly forbid the poor 
countries to develop industry forcing them on “equal“ competition with industrial developed 
countries. The same countries that used opposite policies for their development, than those 
enforced on poor countries. 
 Because Marshall’s plan is today wrongly identified with any plan that brings great 
resources to the poor countries, overlooking its essence – (re)industrialization, it’s necessary 
to specify its main characteristics and differences to Morgenthau’s plan (table 3). 
 It is clearly shown what measures needs to be taken, as well as the current position of 
transition countries, and Serbia. And to make everything perfectly clear, here is the list of 
measures used from the time of Henry VII in England (1485) until South Korea (1960s), later 
banned by World Bank and IMF (table 4). 
 
Table 4. Foundations of two different types of economic theory 
 
Todays mainstream theory (standard canon) The other canon (“Alternative theory“) 
Equillibrium under perfect information and 
perfect foresight 
Learning and decision-making under 
uncertanity (Schumpeter, Keynes, Shackle) 
High level of abstraction Level of abstraction chosen according to 
problem to be resolved 
Man’s wit and will absent Moving force : Geist – und Willenskapital ; 
Man’s wit and will, enterpreneurship 
Innovation and new knowledge are not the 
(inner) moving force. Moving force: “capital 
per se propels the capitalist engine“ 
Moving force: New knowledge which creates 
a demand for capital to be provided from 
financial sector. 
Metaphores are chosen from realm of 
physics. 
Metaphors are (mainly) chosen from the 
realm of biology 
Mode of understanding (is) Mechanistic 
(“begreifen”) 
Modes of understanding are Qualitative 
(“verstehen”). A type of understanding 
irreducible only to numbers and symbols 
Matter (Materialism) Will and wit (capital) (innovation and 
enterpreneurship) precedes matter. 
Focused on Man the consumer (Adam Smith: 
“Man are animals which have learned to 
barter.“) 
Focused on Man the Innovator and Producer 
(Abraham Lincoln: “Man are animals which 
not only work, but innovate.“) 
                                                          
11 Marshall’s expose discovers the core of the relationship between industry and agriculture: „Peasant has 
always produced food to be exchanged for other goods with the people that live in cities. This division of labor 
is the fundament of our modern civilisation. It now treatens to break. Industries in cities are not producing 
enough goods to be traded with peasants who produce food (...) Meantime, there are shortages of food and 
kindling material and in lot of places, people are getting close to starvation. (...) Modern system of the division 
of labor on wich commodity exchange is based, is in danger and could fall apart.“ (According to (Reinert 2006: 
122.)) 
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Focused on static (World as a photography) Focused on change (World as a film/movie) 
History absent, no cumulative effects Cumulative causations. History matters, 
backwash effects (Myrdal, Kaldor, 
Schumpeter, German Historical School) 
Increasing returns at large scales are not 
essential feature 
Increasing returns, or its absence, are 
essential to explaining differences in income 
between firms, regions and nations (Kaldor) 
Seeks to be very precise. (its better to be 
accurately wrong, than approximately 
correct) 
Relevance is more essential than precision. A 
core issue in the economy is trade-off 
between relevance and precision 
„Perfect competition“. (Commodity 
competiton and price competition) is an ideal 
situation for society 
Innovation and knowledge based competition 
is ideal, and engine to progress. Perfect 
competition,with equilibrium and no 
innovation makes capital worthless. 
(Schumpeter, Hayek) 
The market is a mechanism for setting prices Market is also an arena for rivalry, and a 
mechanism for selecting different products 
and solutions (Schumpeter, Nelson & 
Winter) 
Starting assumption for equality: no diversity Diversity is a key factor (Schumpeter, 
Shackle) 
Second assumption for equlity: All economic 
activities are alike, and of equal quality as 
carriers of economic growth and welfare 
Growth and welfare are activity specific. 
Different economic activities present widely 
different potentials for for absorbing new 
knowledge. 
Both theory and policy tend to be 
independant of context. (“one medicine cures 
all“) 
Both theory and policy recommendations are 
highly context dependant  
The economy is largely independant from 
society. 
The economy is firmly embedded in society 
Technology is taken as a free good, as 
“manna from heaven“ 
Knowledge and technology is produced, have 
cost and are protected. This production is 
based on incentives of the system, law, 
institutions  and policies 
Equillibrating forces are at the core of system 
and theory. 
Cumulative forces are more important than 
equillibrating ones , and should therefore be 
the core of the system 
Economy is science of harmony: Economy is 
self-regulating system seeking equillibrium 
and harmony. 
Economy is characterised by inner instability 
and conflicts. Stablity doesnt come by itself, 
it has to be based on policy measures (Carey, 
Polanyi, Weber, Keynes) 
Postulates the representative or typical firm There are no „representative firm“.All firms 
are unique (Penrose) 
Static optimum. Perfect rationality Dynamic optimization under uncertainty. 
Bounded rationality 
No distinction is made between real economy 
and financial economy. 
Conflict between real economy and financial 
economy are normal and must be regulated 
(Minsky, Keynes) 
Saving is caused by refraining from Saving largely results from profits, not by 
14 
 
consumtion and a cause of growth. refraining of consumption(Schumpeter) and 
saving per se is not useful or desirable for 
growth (Keynes) 
 
Source: (Reinert 2006: 151–153) 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
 The analysis of the neoclassical model in both approaches (shock therapy or 
gradualist) reveals the internal inconsistencies of each (Marangos 2002). The implementation 
of this model in either form, or its combination, had to varying degrees common outcomes. 
These were inflation, reduced output, unemployment, external imbalances, destruction of 
welfare system, corruption. Although the neoclassical economists had presented these 
outcomes as “short-term necessary adjustment”, the transition countries are, with some 
exceptions, still in depression. Contrary to ordinary opinions, that transition crisis show as 
result of inconsistency in reforms taking, we can say that this is normaly its result. The 
transition countries had to search, and now search, new paths for development and renewal its 
economies. Serbia is there not alone. In this sense, the differences between two types of 
economic theory (table 4) must be seriously considered. 
 Although it seems that the situation is clear, in reality that’s not. Not because we 
should question these arguments and ideas – it is necessary to that every time. The point is 
something else. Current trends in world are more interdependent than ever, and very few 
countries, especially not Serbia, are able to carry out its own, independent policy. Financial 
capital has more power today than ever, and is heavily bounded with states policy, especially 
in USA, and large corporations, creating so called “Oligarchic triad”12 (WallStreet + US 
Treasury + IMF) that holds true political and economic authority in whole world. 
 So, the most important question today is – could the logic of today`s modern 
capitalism (casino capitalism) i.e. financial capital, be broken? It`s not only about offered 
programs13, it is essential if there is enough social strength capable for that. Same is to be 
considered for Serbia – are there forces that could lead us from ruling (neoliberal) concept 
that leads to poverty, towards industrial oriented concept which could lead the country 
towards development? Much has been spoken about new models of development, based, 
among other, on renewal of industry (see e.g. NSPO 2013), but the question whether it’s 
realistic or it’s a political marketing, remains. Does the will and capability to pursue 
autonomous policy exist? It’s not clearly shown today, and the economic mainstream doesn’t 
even recognize the necessity for that. 
 If the consensus about the later could be achieved, then the development strategy 
should be chosen without prejudice. It shouldn’t be based, not on ruling mainstream, but on 
postulats of almost forgotten “Other Canon”. If that kind of objective review could be done as 
necessary in USA long before ending of WWII14, there is no real reason not to be taken 
today. After all, even renaissance economists told us that the State exists because of the 
                                                          
12 According to (Ковалик 2009: 8). 
13 One of the important programs is made by J. Stiglitz. EuroMemorandum (EuroMemorandum Group 2009) 
also attracts attention, by promoting transition from finance-led capitalism to capitalism. 
14 „No good will come from discussing the merits of intervention or planning as an abstract principle. Human 
societies are impossible in the absence of social controls, and our real task is to determine the fields in which 
such controls should be applied, and to select the machinery best suited for the attainment of our social goals.“ 
(Hoover 1942: 381) 
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systemic effects in an economy, wich also the early A. Smith glorifies (Smit 2008). A. Smith 
prior to his meetings with the French physiocrats. 
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